One major issue is the political risk associated with choosing China as the main partner for the project While China offers the most cost-effective option, strong anti-China sentiments in Vietnam make it a controversial decision for any leader. This is evident in the comparison of existing urban rail projects in Hanoi and HCMC. Despite the Cat Linh

the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, initially estimated at US$35 million per kilometre, ended up costing US$52 million per kilometre when it was finally completed in 2023, four years behind schedule.[16] Furthermore, the current focus on a passenger train with a 350 km/h speed does little to address Vietnam’s existing logistics problems, which are crucial f

train speed in Thailand is 120km/h (soon to be 250km/h when the Bangkok–Nong Khai high-speed rail line opens, perhaps as early as 2026) and in Laos is 160km/h with the recent completion of the China-funded Boten–Vientiane railway. This gap, coupled with China’s expanding railway network in Southeast Asia, risks isolating Vietnam from the emer

People’s Republic of Korea’s claim to be a nuclear-weapon State.’ This change highlights Moscow’s prioritising its geopolitical interests, supporting Kim’s nuclear agenda over proliferation concerns, unlike China, which continues to support denuclearisation Far-reaching strategic alignment These developments, including troop deployment an

had sent their troops. However, both, Russia and North Korea have refuted these claims Nonetheless, if proven to be true, this would be considered a drastic step up in their bilateral ties since the signing of the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June this year. Following the Treaty, there was already a visible increase in high-leve